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In theory, the Supreme Court has provided a "virtually unique 
protection for religious exercise, one substantially greater than for 
speech."I This protection takes the form of a strict scrutiny stan-
dard for general regulations adversely affecting religiously based ac-
tions or refusals to act. The Court, however, when confronted with 
objectionable consequences of the strict review standard, simply 
looks for and finds a way out.2 I do not quarrel with the decision to 
back away from strict review. The Court was wrong from the start 
in heading down this path. It should, however, explicitly acknowl-
edge the error and reformulate its overall approach to enforcing the 
free exercise guarantee. 
I 
Several potential "outs" maintain nominal adherence to strict 
review. First, although establishment clause concerns have deterred 
the Court from overtly rejecting a free exercise claim as not truly 
"religious," the Court has given hints of this view.3 Chief Justice 
Burger's majority opinions in Wisconsin v. Yoder,4 and Thomas v. 
Review Board of Indiana,s accepted free exercise claims but with 
notes of caution. In Yoder, he emphasized that "we are not simply 
dealing with a way of life,"6 such as Thoreau's. More recently, in 
Thomas, while he criticized the state court for too closely reviewing 
the religious claim of a Jehovah's Witness, he also stated that "[o]ne 
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can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly non-
religious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the 
Free Exercise Clause."7 This past term, the Chief Justice's plurality 
opinion in Bowen v. Roys alluded to the fact that "[b]ased on recent 
conversations with an Abenaki chief," a Native American "had re-
cently developed a religious objection to obtaining a Social Security 
number for Little Bird of the Snow [his two-year-old daughter)."9 
It is not overly cynical to suggest that the plurality viewed this 
claim as "bizarre." A later footnote pointed out that virtually every 
government action might be susceptible to some religious objection. 
For example, requiring the filing of a tax return on Wednesday 
(Woden's Day)to might violate Norse mythology. But, as in 
Thomas, there probably also was the recognition that it would have 
been inappropriate expressly to judge the substantiality of the reli-
gious claim. 
It is also possible to escape strict review by finding that a con-
tested regulation places only a slight burden on religious exercise. 
This was one ground on which the Court upheld denial of educa-
tional benefits to conscientious objectors in Johnson v. Robison.tt 
Again, in Bob Jones University v. United States 12 the Court assessed 
the burden on free exercise. It upheld denial of tax-exempt status to 
religious colleges that engaged a racial discrimination. Although 
primarily relying on the government's compelling interest in elimi-
nating all racial discrimination, t3 the Court also considered the bur-
den on the schools. It noted that while there would be "substantial 
impact on the operation of private religious schools," denial of tax-
exempt status "[would] not prevent those schools from observing 
their religious tenets."t4 Most recently, in Tony and Susan Alamo 
Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,ts the Court found virtually no 
burden in a requirement that a religious foundation comply with 
7. 450 U.S. at 715. Justice Stevens, however, concurring in Goldberg v. Weinberger, 
106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986) and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982), stressed the 
inappropriateness of such judgments. 
8. 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986). 
9. /d. at 2150. 
10. /d. at 2156 n.l7. 
II. 415 U.S. 361 (1974). 
12. 461 u.s. 574 (1983). 
13. The Court assumed that the government's interest was equally strong no matter 
what the source of the discrimination. It is not evident, however, that the government has 
the identical interest in eliminating private discrimination as it clearly does in conforming to 
the requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amendments vis-a-vis governmental 
discrimination. 
14. 461 U.S. at 604. 
15. 105 S. Ct. 1953 (1985). 
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minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping requirements of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act. 
While something more than a de minimus burden ought to be 
required, it is difficult to perceive an intelligible framework within 
which the Court determines how much is enough. Moreover, given 
the strict review standard there is a strong incentive to find the bur-
den too small in cases where the Court otherwise would have diffi-
culty sustaining the regulation. 
Finally, if the Court concludes that strict review is applicable, 
it may too readily accept the existence of a "compelling" govern-
mental interest and the "necessity" of the particular regulation as a 
means of advancing that interest. This point was very effectively 
made by Justice Stevens in his United States v. Lee concurrence.I6 
He observed that exempting Amish employers from payment of so-
cial security taxes easily could have been accomplished without det-
riment to the social security system. Therefore he suggested that 
the standard the Court actually applied placed "an almost insur-
mountable burden on any individual who objects [on free exercise 
grounds] to a valid and neutral law of general applicability."11 
Yoder, involving compulsory school attendance laws, was the 
Court's principal exception to this standard, and attempts to distin-
guish it were unconvincing. By contrast, he viewed Thomas and 
Sherbert v. Verner Is as arguably distinguishable instances in which 
a higher standard properly was applied. This was because the deci-
sions involved laws intended to provide a benefit to a limited class of 
otherwise disadvantaged persons. 
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Bowen argued for substitution 
of a deferential standard in one class of free exercise class-those 
involving challenges to generally applicable requirements for receipt 
of government benefits. Bowen was a free exercise challenge to the 
requirement that an applicant for AFDC benefits must furnish the 
state with his social security number. The Burger opinion drew a 
critical "distinction between governmental compulsion and condi-
tions relating to governmental benefits."I9 Cases of direct compul-
sion, for example those involving criminal penalties, warranted 
strict review. But where the government decided to treat all benefit 
applicants alike the following standard applied: 
Absent proof of an intent to discriminate against particular religious beliefs or 
against religion in general, the Government meets its burden when it demonstrates 
16. 455 U.S. at 262. 
17. /d. at 263 n.3. 
18. 374 u.s. 398 (1963). 
19. 106 S. Ct. at 2155. 
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that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its 
application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest [i.e., the 
rational basis test].20 
Thus, contrary to Justice Steven's position, the Burger opinion 
would retain strict review for cases of direct compulsion, such as 
Yoder. However, like Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Burger would 
continue the strict review standard in cases of the Sherbert and 
Thomas variety. He distinguished these as involving a " 'good 
cause' standard [that] created a mechanism for individualized ex-
emptions." Where there was such a mechanism, the failure to ex-
tend an exemption to instances of religious hardship "suggests [an 
impermissible] discriminatory intent."2I 
The Chief Justice's proposal, involving a distinction between 
compulsion and denial of benefits, is objectionable unless one is pre-
pared totally to repudiate the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine.22 The Burger opinion offers no reason why conditions on 
freedom of speech, for example, should be subjected to any greater 
scrutiny than conditions on free exercise of religion. If a denial of 
benefits is not as substantial an interference with free exercise as 
direct compulsion, the same would be true for freedom of speech or 
any other fundamental right. While I have reservations about the 
doctrine's present breadth of application,23 I would not totally 
abandon it. Therefore, in free exercise cases, I would continue to 
apply the same standard to a general regulation that results in a 
denial of benefits as I would to one compelling or forbidding con-
duct and imposing sanctions for violation. 
Justice Stevens endorses such uniformity under a standard by 
which "the objector . . . must shoulder the burden of demonstrat-
ing that there is a unique reason for allowing him a special exemp-
tion from a valid law of general applicability."24 However, he does 
not fully explain his rationale. The remainder of this article, by a 
reconciliation of free exercise with freedom of speech principles, ex-
plains why a somewhat more rigorous intermediate standard of re-
view should be uniformly applied. 
II 
Originally, the Court drew a major distinction between reli-
20. /d. at 2156. 
21. /d. 
22. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2168 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Van Alstyne, The Demise 
of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). 
23. These reservations, which I plan to discuss in a later article, relate to whether the 
doctrine should be uniformly applied without regard to the particular liberty at issue. 
24. Lee, 455 U.S. at 262. 
1987] FREE EXERCISE 151 
gious belief and conduct, finding one absolutely protected and the 
other subject to regulation on essentially a rational basis standard. 
Reynolds v. United Stateszs (sustaining anti-polygamy laws) is a 
good example. Does anyone seriously entertain the idea that if the 
Court were to reconsider Reynolds, it would apply strict review to 
uphold the religiously dictated practice? As in recent decisions, it 
again would find a way out. 
Of course, as Dean Choper has observed, if the free exercise 
clause is to have an independent meaning here, it must protect relig-
iously based conduct not otherwise qualifying under the freedom of 
speech guarantee.26 Further, I agree that it must accord this con-
duct a higher level of protection than that available under the due 
process clause's deferential rational basis standard. However, con-
trary to Dean Choper's position, application of strict review is 
unjustified. 
Strict review should be confined to regulation of religious prac-
tices that are closely "akin"27 to religious speech, that is, those 
highly unlikely to be regulated absent a purpose to suppress the par-
ticular religion. Such practices, for example wearing a cross or a 
Star of David or sprinkling someone in a baptismal ceremony, pro-
duce few if any external effects that are customarily the subject of 
legitimate regulation. These cases in essence are viewpoint-
discrimination free speech cases like those involving outlawing dis-
play of a red flagzs or prohibiting the wearing of black arm bands.29 
By contrast, religiously based conduct such as handling poison-
ous snakes,Jo using drugs,JI or refusing to send one's children to 
high school evoke societal health, safety and welfare concerns unre-
lated to the suppression of any religion. Whether or not any of this 
religiously based conduct having substantial externalities might 
qualify as "speech," it should be protected as "free exercise."32 
25. 98 u.s. 145 (1878). 
26. Choper, supra note 3, at 581-84. The Court has equated free exercise activities with 
freedom of speech in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,269 (1981) (religious discussion and 
prayer meetings); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y For Krishna Consc., 452 U.S. 640, 652 (1981) (distri-
bution of religious literature and solicitation of funds). 
27. Cf Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
28. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
29. Tinker, 383 U.S. 503 (1969). See Choper, supra note 3, at 582. 
30. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976). 
31. Gaskin v. State, 490 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. 1973). 
32. Professor Marshall has argued that aside from protecting religious autonomy and 
preventing direct discrimination against religious practices, free exercise should afford no 
independent protection to religiously based conduct. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Di-
lemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REv. 545, 547 (1983). However, he sug-
gests that this approach "would not be a major incursion on the existing case law" affording 
heightened protection to religious conscience since Yoder, Sherbert, and Thomas all arguably 
involve elements of freedom of speech. !d. at 584-85. 
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However, it should receive no more protection than would ex-
pressive conduct that does fall under the freedom of speech guaran-
tee.33 Accordingly, it would be appropriate to draw on the Court's 
freedom of speech approach in United States v. O'Brien,34 the draft-
card burning case. Assume, for example, that the defendant in 
O'Brien had burned his draft card because of a religious conviction 
that required him to do so. It would not have been logical for the 
Court then to have reached a different result upholding O'Brien's 
right to bum the card. 
If the O'Brien standard had been applied to Yoder and 
Sherbert, the Court probably would have reached different results. 
The critical point in Yoder was that the state's interest in educating 
children became less compelling after the eighth grade. This in 
some ways is reminiscent of the application of the compelling inter-
est standard in Roe v. Wade,Js except there the state's interest be-
came more rather than less compelling with the passage of time. 
Under O'Brien, the government's interest need not have been com-
pelling, only "important" or "substantial." The desire to have 
better-educated citizens capable of choosing a variety of occupa-
tions and professions certainly would have met this standard, even 
for education past the eighth grade. 
As for Sherbert, the government's important interest arguably 
was to ensure that unemployment compensation was paid only to 
people who truly could not find work, not to those who stayed 
home for any of a variety of personal reasons, including those based 
on religion. Applying O'Brien, this would seemingly justify denial 
of benefits to a claimant who refused Saturday work on a religious 
basis. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Thomas observes, however, 
that the state policy in Sherbert seemed to allow other personal rea-
sons for not working but not a religious one (i.e., the case involved 
impermissible discrimination against religion).36 Also, in Sherbert 
the law made special provision for those who refused work on Sun-
day, again raising a problem of religious discrimination. 
33. See Goldberg, 106 S. Ct. at 1312-13 (applying the same deferential standard to a free 
exercise claim as it would to a free speech claim in a military context). 
34. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The Court established the following standard: 
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within 
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substan-
tial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment 
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 
/d. at 377. 
35. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
36. 450 U.S. at 723-24 n.l. In Thomas, by comparison, the state's policy was uniform. 
Cf School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). 
1987] FREE EXERCISE 153 
In Jensen v. Qua ring 37 the driver's license picture decision, the 
Court split 4-4, thereby affirming the Eighth Circuit's acceptance of 
a free exercise claim. The Eighth Circuit described the state inter-
ests as "important" but not compelling.3s This would satisfy the 
O'Brien test. The question of alternatives to requiring a driver's li-
cense photograph is more troublesome. The Eighth Circuit pointed 
out that New York State does not require such a picture as a means 
of rapid identification. However, as the court also noted, at least 
forty-seven states require photographs. While a least restrictive al-
ternatives analysis defeated application of the photograph require-
ment in Quaring, O'Brien's standard that the "incidental restriction 
be no greater than is essential to furtherance of the interest" is not 
as stringent39 and probably would be met. 
Finally, there is Bowen, the social security number case. Chief 
Justice Burger's opinion found that the number requirement 
"clearly promote[d] a legitimate and important public interest," 
namely, preventing fraud in benefit programs. In applying the "rea-
sonable means" part of the suggested test, the plurality opinion ex-
plained in some detail the number's utility in curtailing fraud.40 
While there is a verbal difference between the plurality's standard 
and that in O'Brien, it is unlikely that application of the O'Brien 
standard would require a more persuasive showing of a means-ends 
relation. 
It has been suggested that there is a significant difference be-
tween an O'Brien situation involving speech/conduct versus one in-
volving religion/conduct.4I To qualify for protection under tht free 
exercise clause, the person's conduct must be religiously compelled, 
that is, in the person's mind there is no alternative course that will 
satisfy her religion's requirements. By comparison, someone like 
O'Brien had the choice of expressing his opposition to the draft by 
more conventional means such as distribution of a pamphlet. 
There are several reasons why this distinction is not persuasive. 
First, a person like O'Brien wouldn't have burned his draft card as a 
symbolic protest if he believed that other available means of ex pres-
37. 105 S. Ct. 3492 (1985), a.lf'g Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984). 
38. 728 F.2d 1121, 1126-27 (1984). 
39. See United States v. Albertini, 105 S. Ct. 2897, 2906-07 (1985). 
40. 106 S. Ct. at 2157. 
41. Stone, oral comments on Dean Choper's paper, made at 1986 "Religion and the 
State" symposium, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. The 
paper embodying these comments, "Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the Free 
Exercise Clause," will be published in 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.- (1987). 
Dean Choper would limit free exercise protection to "those who believe that departure 
from certain beliefs will carry uniquely severe consequences extending beyond the grave." 
Supra note 3, at 604. 
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sion were as effective. Often the symbolic protest will be the most 
effective means for the average person. Second, religions are not 
static, they often evolve to meet the strong demands of the society 
in which they happen to exist. For example, the Mormons eventu-
ally concluded that polygamy no longer was religiously compelled. 
Third, O'Brien itself never considered the availability of alternatives 
to the protester; rather, it looked at the government's regulatory 
alternatives. Fourth, while it is troublesome to compare the relative 
values of free speech and of free exercise, the ability to communi-
cate views on issues of public policy by means having substantial 
external consequences is more vital to a democratic society than the 
ability to engage in religious practices having similar costs. 
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has shown little enthusiasm 
for strict review in post-Sherbert and Yoder decisions. Arguably, it 
uses de facto the more lenient O'Brien-type middle-tier standard. 
The Court should make explicit this standard. The standard is sup-
ported in theory because it appropriately puts free exercise and free 
speech cases on the same plane. Moreover, it creates far fewer situ-
ations in which there is arguable tension between enforcement of 
the free exercise and establishment clauses. 
